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ABSTRACT: What should the goals of scientific inquiry be? What questions should scientists investigate, and how 
should our resources be distributed between different lines of investigation? Philip Kitcher has suggested 
that we should answer these questions by appealing to an ideal based on the consideration of hypothetical 
democratic deliberations under ideal circumstances. This paper examines possible arguments that might 
support acceptance of this ideal for science, and argues that neither the arguments presented by Kitcher 
(2001, 2011b) nor traditional arguments for democracy succeed in justifying its acceptance.  
Keywords: Philip Kitcher; Democracy; Science; Philosophy of Science. 
RESUMEN: ¿Cuáles deberían ser las metas de la investigación científica? ¿Qué cuestiones deberían investigar los cien-
tíficos, y cómo deberían distribuirse nuestros recursos entre diferentes líneas de investigación? Philip Kit-
cher ha sugerido que deberíamos responder a estas preguntas apelando a un ideal basado en la considera-
ción de deliberaciones democráticas hipotéticas en circunstancias ideales. Este artículo examina los posibles 
argumentos que podrían apoyar la aceptación de este ideal para la ciencia, y defiende que ni los argumentos 
presentados por Kitcher (2001, 2011b) ni los argumentos tradicionales para la democracia logran justificar 
su aceptación. 
Palabras clave: Philip Kitcher; democracia; ciencia; filosofía de la ciencia. 
Introduction 
Philip Kitcher has been at the forefront of two of the more significant developments 
in the philosophy of science over the last few decades, of two distinct kinds of social 
turns. First, he has contributed to the socializing of the philosophy of science by stud-
ying the significance of the social division of cognitive labor. Second, in his more re-
cent writings, he has sought to focus the philosophical community’s attention on 
questions about the social impact of science and on the collective good which science 
ought to pursue. Thus he has placed a previously neglected set of questions on the 
agenda of the philosophy of science, and attempted to provide the basis for answering 
these by articulating an ideal of a ‘well-ordered science’. It is on this ideal, an ideal of 
science properly functioning to serve the attainment of proper collective goals, that I 
focus here.  
 There is a sense in which these neglected questions which Kitcher (2001) places on 
the agenda of the philosophy of science are more difficult to answer than some of the 
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more traditional questions of the discipline. These questions do not merely require us 
to determine how science can obtain certain specified goals—such as truth and 
knowledge; they require that we determine what goals science ought to pursue, and 
what truths scientists should seek to know. Kitcher’s suggestion is that the answer to 
these questions be determined procedurally on the basis of an ideal hypothetical dem-
ocratic procedure: The goals that science ought to pursue, and the questions which 
scientists ought to study should be those that would have been selected by a hypothet-
ical democratic procedure under ideal circumstances.  
 In this paper I evaluate the merits of Kitcher’s proposed democratic ideal and his 
reasons for adopting it. I focus on the way in which this ideal is developed and de-
fended in Kitcher (2001),1 and in particular, on its application to the question about 
the way the scientific agenda should be set: on the idea that the scientific agenda 
should conform to what would be decided upon, if the decision about the agenda 
would be made through ideal hypothetical democratic deliberation.2 I argue that while 
we do need to articulate a standard against which we can evaluate the organization of 
science and its agenda, this ideal should not be set by the kind of hypothetical demo-
cratic procedure envisaged by Kitcher. For the reasons for insisting on our communi-
ties being governed by democratic decision-making procedures do not require that the 
scientific agenda be set by a hypothetical democratic procedure.  
 The next section briefly defends Kitcher’s claim that philosophers of science need 
to articulate a standard against which scientific institutions can be evaluated. Section 2, 
presents Kitcher’s (2001) reasons for suggesting that this standard should be specified 
in terms of the decisions adopted by a hypothetical democratic procedure, and ex-
plains why these are lacking. The main part of the paper then examines whether the 
kind of considerations appealed to by traditional arguments for democracy can pro-
vide us with reasons for adopting Kitcher’s democratic ideal. I argue that neither in-
strumental arguments for democracy (section 3), nor egalitarian principles (section 4) 
support adopting it as an ideal for science. Section 5 argues against an alternative way 
of supporting this ideal, suggested in Kitcher (2011b). Section 6 suggests that the hy-
pothetical democratic procedure described by Kitcher can nonetheless play a role, al-
beit a more modest one, in our evaluation of scientific institutions. 
                                                      
1 While my main focus here is on Kitcher (2001), in section 4 I briefly address the way Kitcher supports 
his suggested ideal in Kitcher (2011b).  
2 I am thus following Kitcher (2001) in focusing primarily on the scientific agenda, and not on other 
questions to which the discussion of the proper goals of science might be relevant. Thus, some would 
suggest that certain moral values have a legitimate role not only in determining what questions scien-
tists study, but also in determining what answers to accept. However, that such values have a legiti-
mate role in the former context is much less controversial, and it is for this reason that I focus on it 
here. While I will not address here the question whether hypothetical democratic procedures should 
play a role in other contexts, such as that of the decision which scientific theories to accept, a similar 
argument to the one presented here would seem to apply to them too. 
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1. The Need for a Standard 
There are many goals which we might hope to obtain through scientific inquiry. Scien-
tific inquiry allows us to obtain practical benefits, such as life-saving drugs and cost-
saving technologies, as well as knowledge and understanding, which may be valuable 
for their own sake. At the same time, scientific inquiry can also have negative effects: 
from the proliferation of new forms of lethal weapons to the strengthening of biases 
and prejudices (Kitcher 2001, 93-108). In light of these different benefits and harms 
that scientific inquiry might engender, what should the goals of scientific inquiry be? 
Which questions should scientists investigate? And in the investigation of which ques-
tions should our resources be invested? 
 Consider the agenda of biomedical research and what is known as the 10/90 gap: 
It has been argued that only ten percent of the resources invested in health research 
are devoted to addressing diseases that are responsible for ninety percent of humani-
ty's burden of disease. Significantly more resources are invested in the study of diseas-
es of the rich than of the poor (Reiss and Kitcher 2009). Several critics have thought 
that this relative neglect of diseases of the poor is wrong. Kitcher does of course 
agree. What sets his discussion apart is his attempt to articulate a standard against 
which the distribution of resources to scientific and biomedical research can be evalu-
ated, and which supports this criticism of current research agenda.  
 One need not accept Kitcher's suggested standard to accept his claim about the 
need for some kind of standard. Even if one thought that the current way in which 
science is organized and the scientific agenda is set is as good as any other, or even 
better, one must be able to point at some kind of standard against which the organiza-
tion of science can be evaluated. Kitcher's important claim is that philosophers of sci-
ence have failed to articulate an adequate standard against which the organization of 
science can be judged. 
2. Kitcher’s Argument for a Democratic Ideal 
 It might be thought that there is no question about the proper goals of science, 
truth or knowledge being its recognized goals. However, Kitcher (2001) rejects this 
idea. His rejection of it is based, first, on the observation that to the extent that sci-
ence is aimed at the attainment of truth, it is not aimed at the attainment of all truths, 
but only of significant truths. Moreover, he argues, there is no contextually independ-
ent concept of epistemic significance. So we cannot specify the kinds of truths that 
ought to be sought, unless we take into account the various concerns, interests, and 
circumstances of various groups and individuals. Furthermore, the goal of science 
should not even be the unrestricted attainment of epistemically significant truths. 
Other harms and benefits that are produced by scientific inquiry must also figure in 
the determination of the goals of science.   
 If the philosophy of science is to address questions about the goals that science 
ought to pursue, as Kitcher rightly insists that it must; and if Kitcher is right in reject-
ing the idea that we can answer such questions by saying that truth, or knowledge, 
ought to be the goal of science, then it would seem that a whole set of questions has 
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been left out of traditional philosophy of science. To correct for this neglect, philoso-
phers of science must face questions and difficulties which often seemed to be the 
business of moral and political philosophers and which philosophers of science often 
sought to avoid. In addition to more traditional questions about good ways of seeking 
significant truths, philosophers of science must ask themselves, “What is the collective 
good that inquiry should promote” (Kitcher 2001, 116). Answering this question may 
require addressing questions concerning the relations between individual and collec-
tive good, in addition to meta-ethical questions about the very status of claims about 
the Good. As Kitcher admits, there is therefore a sense in which the questions to-
wards which he draws our attention are more difficult to answer than more traditional 
ones (2001, 114).  
 It is partially because of these difficulties that Kitcher suggests that the scientific 
agenda should be measured against an ideal democratic procedure (2001, 116).3 The 
way the scientific agenda is set will differently affect different members of society, and 
so, to determine what the scientific agenda should be like we must somehow balance 
the diverging interests and views of different segments of the community. But how 
are these different interests to be weighed against each-other? Kitcher expresses 
doubts about the possibility of defending an objective conception of well-being, and 
has no solution to the problem of aggregating the interests of different individuals in-
to a measure of collective well-being. Because of that, he seeks to circumvent these 
difficulties, and proposes to answer the question of the scientific agenda by relying on 
the fact that in our community democratic ideals are taken for granted. As long as our 
discussion concerns the questions that scientists ought to pursue within societies that 
honor democratic ideals we can determine what the scientific agenda should be like by 
consulting an ideal democratic procedure: by considering what would be decided upon 
if the scientific agenda would be determined by properly informed citizens who must 
make a decision through ideal democratic deliberations.  
 Kitcher, it is important to note, does not suggest that the scientific agenda be de-
termined by actual majority vote (2001, 123). He is well aware of public ignorance 
about scientific matters (Atchison 2012; Anderson 2011), and is wary of “tyranny of 
the ignorant” (Kitcher 2001, 2011b). It is for this reason that Kitcher suggests that the 
scientific agenda not conform to actual majority vote, but that it be evaluated against 
an ideal determined by considering a hypothetical procedure that is free from some of 
the obvious drawbacks of vulgar democracy. Thus we are to measure the agenda of 
science against a hypothetical decision that is both democratic and informed: we are to 
consider the hypothetical decision arrived at on the basis of the votes of hypothetical 
individuals who, starting with different preferences about the scientific agenda, are 
provided with relevant information about the practical and epistemic significance of 
possible lines of inquiry; who converse with each other about these lines of inquiry; 
who all aim to arrive at a consensus which fairly represents the preferences of all par-
ties; and who are prepared to revise their personal tutored preferences in recognition 
                                                      
3 Kitcher (2011b) presents a very different way of motivating a similar democratic ideal. See section 5 for 
a discussion.  
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of the needs of others (2001, 118-123). It is against the hypothetical decision of such 
ideal deliberators that actual scientific institutions and their agenda should be meas-
ured. 
 As noted above, Kitcher attempts to justify reliance on a democratic ideal on the 
basis of the fact that commitment to democracy is a common currency of our public 
lives. However, this line of argumentation faces an obvious challenge. Just as unani-
mous recognition of the value of truth need not imply that the goal of science should 
be the attainment of truth, so recognition of the value of democracy does not mean 
that the goals of science should be specified by democratic procedures. Even if we all 
agree on the value of democracy, surely we should also agree that other things but 
democracy are valuable, and that the attainment of these is not always best served by 
the institution of democratic procedures (Keren 2011). To determine whether we 
should accept a democratic ideal for science, we should consider the reasons that justi-
fy our commitment to democratic institutions, and the way these and other reasons 
apply in the case of science. 
3. Kitcher’s Ideal and Instrumental Arguments for Democracy 
Different kinds of considerations have been proposed in support of the moral desira-
bility of democracy. In general, these fall under two types: instrumental arguments and 
those based on claims about the intrinsic worth of democracy (Christiano 2003). 
However, since Kitcher advocates an ideal determined by a hypothetical democratic 
procedure, and not one based on actual democratic voting, not all of these arguments 
are applicable to the recommended procedure. Indeed, as I shall presently argue, in-
strumental considerations that support actually instituting democratic decision-making 
do not seem to favor a hypothetical democratic procedure.  
 Instrumental arguments for democracy are based on claims about the causal effects 
of democratic decision-making. But the causal effects of actually implementing demo-
cratic decision-making procedures and of merely considering hypothetical procedures 
and acting accordingly are obviously quite different. For instance: one historically im-
portant type of argument in favor of democracy is based on claims about the positive 
effects of participation in democratic decision-making on the character of citizens 
(Mill 1861/1991). Obviously, running institutions by considering hypothetical demo-
cratic voting procedure would not have similar effects on the character of community 
members.  
 Other instrumental arguments for democracy also do not favor a hypothetical 
democratic procedure. The point is not that all causal claims which are true of actual 
democratic procedures do not hold in the case of hypothetical democratic procedures 
and institutions guided by them. We can describe hypothetical democratic procedures 
that would lead to the same kind of good effects attributed to actual procedures, albeit 
through alternative causal chains. The point is, however, that even if we can imagine 
such hypothetical procedures, this may not give us reason to design institutions that 
are guided by our considerations of them. At least not, if instrumental arguments for 
democracy are sound. Thus consider the claim that democratic decision-making is 
more likely than other forms of decision-making to pick out the best policy (Estlund 
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2003). We can imagine a hypothetical democratic procedure that will be even better 
than actual democratic procedures in this respect—one that by definition satisfies all 
the conditions of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem. However, the fact that we can imagine such a 
procedure provides us with no good reason for guiding institutions by our considera-
tions of such a hypothetical procedure. For while such a procedure is very good at 
picking the best policy, we are not very good at predicting what policy such a hypo-
thetical procedure would pick.  
 To show that no instrumental argument for democracy supports adopting Kitch-
er’s democratic ideal, we ultimately need to evaluate all plausible instrumental argu-
ments for democracy, and examine the extent to which each of them can support a 
hypothetical democratic procedure. Obviously this is something that I cannot do here. 
However, there are prima facie reasons to believe that the point made here does not 
apply only to epistemic arguments for democracy, or to arguments based on the ef-
fects of democracy on the character of individuals. If instrumental arguments for de-
mocracy are sound, then there are reasons to think that the point generalizes. For such 
instrumental arguments hinge on the claim that we don’t have the ability of guarantee-
ing the same good result obtained by democracy without implementing actual demo-
cratic procedures. Indeed, if we could obtain the same good results attributed to actual 
democratic decision-making by letting consideration of hypothetical democratic pro-
cedures guide our institutions, this would constitute a powerful argument against the 
claim that the state should be governed by actual democratic procedures. For were 
this the case, then we could get all the good consequences of democratic voting and 
deliberation, while avoiding some of the familiar shortcomings of modern democra-
cies. 
4. Equality and the scientific agenda  
The idea that instrumental arguments for democracy can justify acceptance of Kitch-
er’s suggested ideal thus seems unpromising. Indeed, the same is also true of at least 
some arguments that point to intrinsically valuable features of democracy. Of the var-
ious claims about the kind of intrinsic value attributable to democratic decision proce-
dures, some, such as liberty and self-governance, do not seem to be enjoyed by merely 
hypothetical decision procedure. Arguably, if any form of argument which supports 
our commitment to democracy can be thought to support adopting an ideal of science 
set by a hypothetical democratic standard, it is an egalitarian argument. Indeed, many 
of the details of Kitcher’s discussion suggest that he would see his proposed ideal as 
being supported by egalitarian considerations (Kitcher 2001, 2011b; Flory and Kitcher 
2004; Reiss and Kitcher 2009).  
 If this is correct, then the way to justify the proposed democratic ideal is different 
from the official justification suggested for it in Kitcher (2001). If acceptance of a hy-
pothetical democratic ideal for science is justified, what justifies it is not the consensu-
al commitment to some kind of value, democratic or egalitarian. For there is “a wide 
menu of answers to the question: equality of what?” (Sen 1982), as there is also a wide 
menu of answers to the question: democracy for what? Many of the answers on these 
menus do not support adopting a hypothetical democratic procedure. And even if 
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some of the answers on the menu do support adopting such an ideal for science, there 
is arguably no consensual commitment to them. Accordingly, if we are to justify the 
proposed ideal for science, we should not appeal to the consensus within our society. 
Instead, we should show that there is some egalitarian principle that supports adopting 
this ideal, and argue that this egalitarian principle is plausible, whether it is widely ac-
cepted or not.  
 If this is the way the argument should proceed, then we can see the force behind 
some of Kitcher's more important criticisms of contemporary scientific agenda. Argu-
ably, certain features of contemporary science, such as the neglect of certain diseases 
affecting the poor, would not survive scrutiny against any plausible version of egalitar-
ianism. Such neglect would be deemed unjustifiable whether it is judged against a to-
tal-utility conception of equality, or against a Rawlsian conception; against an equal-
consideration conception of equality or against an equal-say conception. And while it 
is controversial which kind of conception of equality is most plausible, it is quite plau-
sible that at least one of these is a valid conception of equality.  
 However, if this is the structure of the best argument for the proposed ideal for 
science then, I want to argue, we should ultimately reject this ideal. For no plausible 
egalitarian principle would require that the actual scientific agenda conform to the 
agenda selected by a hypothetical democratic procedure. Indeed, no plausible egalitari-
an principles would require this, even if it suggested that we should allow a hypothet-
ical democratic procedure to determine our decision with respect to some of the most 
principled, fundamental questions facing our community. Even if an egalitarian prin-
ciple, such as a principle of equal say, would require that the principles that govern our 
societies conform to those that would be decided upon by an ideal democratic proce-
dure, the principles thus decided upon would not require that we determine the scien-
tific agenda in the same way. For plausible moral principles, including egalitarian prin-
ciples, provide us with reasons against allowing majority vote to determine our deci-
sion on many issues, including the way the scientific agenda is set.  
 Thus, any moral principle that requires equal rights to all would lead to such a con-
clusion, if according to this principle, the bundle of rights to which all are entitled 
contains a right to property. Because I have a right to my own property, the way it is 
used should not be determined by a democratic vote, actual or ideal. Surely, within 
certain constraints, I should be the one who determines how my property is used. 
Since one thing that individuals might want to do with their own property, resources, 
and time, is to invest these in scientific research, principles assigning equal rights to all 
would arguably allow them to do so in ways that do not conform with actual or ideal 
democratic vote.  
 Utilitarian principle of equality would also lead to similar conclusions. First, such 
principles arguably support assigning certain property rights to individuals, and so, as 
suggested above, would allow individuals to determine how their property is used for 
the promotion of scientific inquiry. Moreover, such principles would not require giv-
ing everyone an equal say when it comes to questions about the scientific agenda be-
cause sometimes such questions have a greater effect on one group of individuals than 
on another. To see this, let us focus on questions about truths of pure epistemic sig-
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nificance: truths, whose knowledge both is inherently valuable and has no foreseeable 
instrumental value.4 In as much as we must decide between two proposals for the 
agendas of science that differ only in their ranking of scientific questions of pure epis-
temic significance, should the decision between these be made in a democratic fash-
ion? The fact of the cognitive division of labor is of some significance here. Obviously 
not all members of the community participate equally in the pursuit of such truths. 
Arguably, because of that, the lives and well-being of those who do actively pursue 
them—call these pure scientists—is impacted in a more significant way when it comes to 
decision about which truths of pure epistemic significance to pursue. This is so both 
because pure scientists actively participate in the pursuit of such truths, and because 
knowledge of such truths is for them an important personal goal. In contrast, layper-
sons and scientists who do not pursue such truths often choose not to do so at least 
partially because they have other personal goals that are more important to them. Un-
less we accept an account of well-being that completely divorces between one’s well-
being and one’s preferences and personal goal—an account that Kitcher (2001) rightly 
considers as implausible—we should recognize that decisions about which questions 
of pure epistemic significance to invest in tend to have a greater effect on the well-
being of pure scientists, than on that of laypersons and other scientist.5 Accordingly, 
in deciding between proposals that differ only in their ranking of questions of pure ep-
istemic significance, a utilitarian principle would not suggest that everyone should be 
given an equal say. Instead, it would arguably give greater say to those whose well-
being would be affected by the decision, namely pure scientists.6 
 It might be thought that some other egalitarian principle might support a hypo-
thetical democratic ideal for science. Or that we should accept a hypothetical demo-
cratic ideal for science, but apply it in a more restricted way: not to the determination 
of the scientific agenda at large, but only to the determination of the agenda of scien-
tific inquiry funded by the public, and perhaps only to the pursuit of truths which are 
not of pure epistemic significance. But I think that the line of reasoning suggested 
here applies quite generally: no egalitarian principle would demand that the scientific 
agenda be measured against a hypothetical democratic ideal; not even when it comes 
to scientific research with foreseeable instrumental value funded by the public. Egali-
tarian principles can be broadly divided into ones that require substantive equality in 
                                                      
4 Of course, science does not pursue only truths of pure epistemic significance, and there is no reason to 
think that such truths are of special importance. Arguably, most significant truths studied by science, 
including those that it is inherently valuable to know, have practical significance. Often, as in the 
study of question concerning climate change, the practical value of such knowledge far exceeds its in-
herent value.  
5 I am not claiming that decisions about the scientific agenda will generally have a greater impact on the 
well-being of scientists. The claim is only true in as much as the significance of the truth pursued is 
owed to the inherent value of knowledge, rather than to its practical significance.  
6 Note that what I say here in no way commits me to “the myth of purity”, according to which moral and 
political concerns are irrelevant to the evaluation of “pure science” (Kitcher 2001). On the contrary: 
What I am exploring here are the implications of moral principles such as utilitarianism to the inves-
tigation of questions of pure epistemic significance. 
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the distribution of some kind of goods, resources, or of wellbeing; and procedural 
principles that require some kind of equality in the political power different individuals 
enjoy. And there are reasons to think that both kinds of principles would not require 
that the scientific agenda conform to what would be decided by a hypothetical demo-
cratic procedure. 
 Consider first why egalitarian principle of the former substantive kind would not 
demand that the actual scientific agenda be measured against that adopted by a hypo-
thetical democratic procedure. Unlike a hypothetical decision situation of the kind de-
scribed by Rawls’ original position (1971), where all rational individuals are supposed 
to agree in their decision, a hypothetical democratic procedure is one in which rational 
individuals can differ in their decision under the hypothetical choice situation. As a re-
sult, the options selected by such a democratic procedure would depend on contin-
gent features of the community. There is no reason to believe that the option selected 
by such a procedure would generally fulfill the kind of distribution required by any 
substantive egalitarian principle; and therefore no reason to think that substantive 
egalitarian principles would suggest that a hypothetical democratic procedure would 
set the right standard for evaluating the scientific agenda. 
 But if substantial egalitarian principles would not demand that the scientific agenda 
be evaluated against a standard set by such a procedure, then the same would be true 
of egalitarian principles requiring equality in political power. Even if principles of the 
latter kind would require that the principles that govern our societies be determined by 
a democratic procedure, actual or ideal, the principles decided upon in this way may 
not require that the scientific agenda be determined in the same way. A community of 
individuals with equal political power might decide in a democratic way that its public 
institutions are to be governed in accordance with certain substantive principle. And 
as suggested in the previous paragraph, such substantive principles would not suggest 
that a hypothetical democratic procedure would set the right standard against which to 
measure the scientific agenda.  
 I conclude therefore that familiar arguments for the claim that the state should be 
governed by democratic institutions, do not suggest that the scientific agenda be de-
termined by considering a hypothetical democratic procedure. Instrumental arguments 
for democracy, I have argued, do not support hypothetical democratic procedures. 
And egalitarian principles that require that the state be democratically governed, even 
those that require giving all an equal say, need not entail giving everyone an equal say 
regarding science and its agenda. 
5. Democracy and the Ethical Project 
In his most recent writings, Kitcher (2011b) has proposed a very different way of 
supporting the adoption of a democratic ideal for science that does not appeal to tra-
ditional arguments for democracy. Instead, the argument is based on a nontraditional 
meta-ethical account developed in Kitcher (2011a). To end my discussion of the pro-
posed ideal for science, I will briefly explain why the reasoning offered in the previous 
sections also appears to undermine this argument for the proposed ideal for science. 
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 Kitcher (2011a) defends a pragmatic, naturalistic account of morality and proposes 
a general method of investigation of values, which closely resembles the method sug-
gested in Kitcher (2001) for determining the goals of science:7 In general, he suggests, 
decisions about norms and values should accord with those that would be reached 
through ideal egalitarian deliberation involving all of humanity, under conditions of 
mutual engagement. It is on the basis of this account of the method of investigation 
of values in general that Kitcher suggests that the goals of science in particular should 
conform to what would be decided upon through a process of ideal democratic delib-
eration (2011b, 114).  
 Kitcher’s (2011a) non-traditional meta-ethical account, which is supposed to moti-
vate acceptance of the proposed method of ethical investigation, rejects much of the 
received view about such notions as ethical authority, ethical truth, and ethical pro-
gress. It rejects the very ideas of independent moral truth, and of ethical experts who 
have some special access to such truths. And it offers an account of ethical truth in 
terms of a more basic concept of ethical progress, thus reversing the traditionally-
perceived relations between these concepts. The proposal of a method of ethical in-
vestigation based on ideal egalitarian deliberations emerges from this understanding of 
the notion of moral truth and from the rejection of the very idea of ethical expertise.  
 Obviously, I cannot do justice here to this highly original and ambitious meta-
ethical picture. However, even if we were to accept it, I doubt whether this would 
mean that we should accept Kitcher’s suggested ideal for science. Even if we under-
stand the notion of ethical truth in the way suggested by Kitcher, this still leaves open 
the question, which ethical principles are true. And even if by following Kitcher’s egal-
itarian method of investigation, we come to accept some ethical principle as true—call 
it EP—this does not mean that we should determine the scientific agenda by follow-
ing the same egalitarian method of investigation. After all, EP might require a very dif-
ferent division of labor when it comes to determining how to prioritize different lines 
of scientific inquiry. Utilitarianism can again serve as a case in point: Following Kitch-
er’s egalitarian method of investigation, we might perhaps come to accept the utilitari-
an principle as true. Once it is accepted, the principle would arguably not suggest that 
everyone should have an equal say when setting the scientific agenda. Such a principle 
might give those who invest their resources in scientific inquiry greater say about the 
priorities of such inquiry, if this would motivate beneficial investment in scientific in-
quiry. Or, as suggested in the previous section, it might sometimes give pure scientists 
greater say about the priorities of scientific inquiry in as much as such inquiry is valua-
ble because of its inherent value. Therefore, even if Kitcher is correct that we should 
determine whether utilitarianism is true by considering ideal egalitarian deliberations, 
this does not entail that we should determine how to prioritize scientific lines of inves-
tigation by likewise considering the results of ideal egalitarian deliberations.  
                                                      
7 While the general method of ethical investigation suggested in Kitcher (2011a) resembles the method of 
determining the goal of science, it is not obvious that the former is merely a generalized version of 
the latter. Majority vote, for example, has an important role in determining the agenda of well-
ordered science (Kitcher 2001, 2011b), but it is not obvious if it is has a similar role in the proposed 
method of investigation of values in general. 
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6. Conclusions: A Role for Democracy? 
In asking about the proper goals of science, and in articulating an ideal in terms of 
which the question can be answered, Kitcher’s main task appears to be that of placing 
this fundamental question on the philosophical agenda, and of showing that it is wor-
thy of, and amenable to, philosophical discussion. Kitcher has no pretensions that his 
proposed answer is the correct one. Instead, his explicitly stated task is that of “provid-
ing an answer,” one that would help us “delineate the area in which a plausible answer 
may be taken to lie” (2001, 116).  
 I have argued here that we should reject this suggested answer. Neither traditional 
arguments for democracy nor Kitcher’s non-traditional meta-ethical account support 
the adoption of a hypothetical democratic ideal for science. This does not mean that 
the ideal should be determined by an alternative procedure, through actual democratic 
voting, or by a committee of expert scientists, or of renowned philosophers. In as 
much as our question concerns the ideal standard, against which scientific institutions 
and their agenda should be measured, I doubt whether any proposed procedure would 
provide us with the correct answer. For while we face deep and difficult questions in our 
attempt to find this answer, I doubt whether we can avoid these difficulties by em-
ploying a procedural conception of this sought after moral ideal. Instead, we have no 
choice but to admit to our lack of clarity and to our moral uncertainty, while attempt-
ing to minimize them. 
 Admitting to our uncertainty suggests an alternative way in which a hypothetical 
democratic procedure of the kind envisaged by Kitcher might help us in delineating 
the area in which a plausible answer lies. Instead of thinking of such a procedure as 
what determines the correct answer, we should think of it as a device, perhaps a heu-
ristic device, which might serve along with other methods in our search for the correct 
articulation of the ideal. If we were to find that scientific institutions follow an agenda 
that would not be approved by the kind of ideal deliberations envisaged by Kitcher, 
this is a possible indication that something has gone wrong with these institutions. 
And if we were to find that our own view about the priorities of science does not cor-
respond to what would be approved by such ideal democratic deliberations, this 
should give us reason to reexamine our own view. Does this fact indicate that we have 
not taken into account the interest of all relevant parties, or that we have given too 
much weight to our own interests? Knowledge that we disagree with others, and in 
particular, with ideally situated and numerous others, provides an important resource 
for coping with our known epistemic infirmities and an opportunity for epistemic self-
improvement (Christensen 2007). Thus I do think that the kind of hypothetical delib-
erations envisaged by Kitcher can play an important role in our consideration of the 
scientific agenda. But if my argument is sound, then the role that such hypothetical 
democratic deliberations should play within our consideration is different, and more 
modest, than that suggested by Kitcher. Knowledge of what would be approved by 
such hypothetical deliberations does not settle the question about what the scientific 
agenda should be like, but it might help us get closer to the correct answer. 
Arnon KEREN 
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